Was The Atomic Bomb Really Necessary free essay sample

World War Ii Essay, Research Paper Was the Atomic Bomb Really Necessary World War II # 8220 ; I have to make up ones mind Nipponese strategy-shall we invade Japan proper or shall we bomb and obstruct? That is my difficult determination to day of the month. But I # 8217 ; ll do it when I have all the facts. # 8221 ; -Harry S. Truman Many inquiries have arisen covering with the demand for the atomic bomb since it was twice used in 1945 to stop World War II on the Pacific Front. Make it salvage lives when compared to an all out invasion, or could it hold been a statement to Russia in an attempt to get down stamp downing Communism? What is it that made the United States feel that Japan would non travel down by conventional bombardment and invasion like we had done with Germany? Most of this thought came from the fact that Japan had instilled an attitude in their people to ever contend until decease. We will write a custom essay sample on Was The Atomic Bomb Really Necessary or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page Resignation was considered a shame and it would be better for them to decease for their state. Besides the United States was holding problem contending through the islands that Japan had taken over due to their isolation from one another and that there were so many of them. Japan, in actuality, was chosen as the mark in 1943. There was a fright that if the bomb did non work on Germany that the Germans would be able to dismantle it and calculate out how to do it work. There was non this fright with Japan. Besides a retaliation factor was set in the bosom of Americans of all time since the Nipponese onslaught on Pearl Harbor. The American citizens were behind utilizing the bomb because they were tired of the war. It had been five old ages and many had non seen their loved 1s and were afraid they would non of all time once more if they had to occupy Japan # 8217 ; s mainland. Americans were non willing to give more lives to stop this war. They felt that the developed engineering should be used. After all, making the atomic bomb had been a long and difficult undertaking. It had taken many old ages of planning, developing, and proving. The devising of the bomb combined theories and thoughts from infinite chemists and physicists. Most of all it had cost big sums of money and the undertaking workers feared being investigated by the postwar Congress if it was discovered that support had gone to a secret undertaking with nil to demo for it. The option was an all out invasion of Japan with continued bombing foraies. In July 1945, an invasion was being planned by all of the Alliess. The program included the United State # 8217 ; s Navy whose function was to enforce a encirclement on Japan to seek to strangulate them economically into resignation. Then on July 16 the A-bomb was successfully tested. Truman so made his determination to utilize it unless Japan surrendered. On July 26 Truman, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek issued an ultimatum demanding the unconditioned resignation of Japan. Japan chose non to give up at that clip. Feelingss of a British scientist P.M.S. Blackett were a spot different. He wrote a book titled Fear, War, and the Bomb, in which he said that the United States wanted to stop the war with Japan prior to Russia # 8217 ; s entryway. Blackett felt that the USA wanted all of the recognition for get the better ofing Japan and that we were trusting to discourage Russia from occupying other lands in an a ttempt to stamp down Communism. He feels that the dropping of the bomb was # 8216 ; the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia. ( www.yahoo.com/Arts/Humanities/ History/20th_Century/World_War_II/Atomic_Bomb_The/ ) Besides an American historiographer, Gar Alperovitz, wrote a book titled Atomic Diplomacy. His book contains a diary entry from 28 July 1945 by U.S. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that describes Secretary of State James F. Byrnes as # 8216 ; most dying to acquire the Nipponese matter over with before the Russians got in # 8217 ; . ( www.yahoo.com/Arts/Humanities/ History/20th_Century/World War_II/Atomic_Bomb/The/ ) Besides Byrnes # 8217 ; adjunct Secretary of State, Walter Brown, has a diary entry that suggests that Truman and Byrnes saw the bomb as a manner to cut down Soviet political influence on Asia, peculiarly China. This was fundamentally stating that in order for Americans to hold an advantage over the Russians in acquiring China th at a one-fourth of a million Nipponese had to decease. Most of the deceased would likely be adult females and kids. When discoursing the decision-making procedure many people had sentiments in favour of the usage of the bombs. A secret authorities advisory group called the Interim Committee on June 1, 1945, recommended to President Truman # 8220 ; that the bomb should be used against Japan every bit shortly as possible ; that it should be used on a war works surrounded by workers # 8217 ; places ; and that it be used without anterior warning. # 8221 ; Byrnes felt that one million lives would be saved ; General George Marshall stated that the figure would be closer to a half a million. After the dropping of the two bombs Truman noted that Hiroshima was a military base and that we wished to avoid killing civilians. Despite the fact that Truman was seeking to warrant killing civilians people environing him believed that the bomb would non make much more injury than continued conventional bombardment. This thought came from the fact that in Tokyo entirely, conventional bombardment had killed 100,00 0 civilians. This fundamentally forced killing civilians to be deemed proper and inevitable even in democratic states. Truman in a diary entry on August 11 of 1945 stated that # 8220 ; cipher is more disturbed over the usage of Atomic bombs than I am but I was greatly disturbed over the indefensible onslaught by the Japanese of Pearl Harbor and their slaying of our captives of war. The lone linguistic communication they seem to understand is the 1 we have been utilizing to pelt them. # 8221 ; A US intelligence survey does state that Truman knew that the bomb was non truly needed. What the survey does non indicate out is that Stalin # 8217 ; s declaration of war was non truly sufficient plenty for Truman # 8217 ; s determination. He did non experience Stalin was that reliable. The Russian leader had promised for mont Hs to come in the war against Japan but neer did do a declaration until August the 6th, the twenty-four hours of the bombardment of Hiroshima. An American soldier stationed in North Africa had an sentiment that supported Truman’s beliefs about Russia. The soldier felt that it would be pathetic to anticipate the Soviet Union to come in the war against Japan for three chief grounds: the Soviets had heavy losingss contending Germany ; the soldiers were left dog-tired and starvation ; and they would hold to be transported about midway around the Earth from western Russian to the eastern forepart. This soldier’s credibleness is non known but his statement tantrums in with Truman’s ain beliefs. It is believed that Truman, beneath the surface, felt an overdone sense of ego for the US, a mentality that was foremost installed in the United States during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidential term. He felt that if we did non utilize our great powers that some other state certainly would. Some people feel that the bomb was used for the intent of maintaining the American people behind the war attempt. The war had been dragging on and the decease toll for America kept lifting. Introducing this arm of antecedently unheard-of destructive force would acquire the backup of the American people. The bomb certainly would procure an American triumph without the assistance of the Soviet Union. ( Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Politicss of Memory ) However, many people were against utilizing the atomic bombs, before and after they were really used. A study set up by the War Department called the US Strategic Bombing Survey came to this decision after questioning 100s of Nipponese in 1944. # 8216 ; Japan would hold surrendered by December 31, 1945, even if the bombs were non dropped, even if Russian had non entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. # 8217 ; Ralph Bard, who was under the Secretary of the Navy and a member of the commission, wrote a memo to Secretary of War Henry Stimson on June 27, 1945. It is besides believed that he discussed this memo with Truman in early July. The memoranda stated that Japan should hold prior warning if the bomb is used ; he did non desire the United States position of a great human-centered state to be damaged. He besides felt that Japan was ready to give up and that there would be no injury in waiting a small piece longer to see what they would make to sto p the war. Others suggested dropping the bomb in a topographic point where the Nipponeses could see its destructive forces and so allowing them make up ones mind if it was still deserving go oning the war attempt. Professor Howard Zinn of Boston University wrote A People # 8217 ; s History of the United States. In his book, he says that the # 8216 ; estimations of invasion losingss were non realistic, and seem to hold been pulled out of the air to warrant bombing which, as their effects became known, horrified more and more people. # 8217 ; ( www.yahoo.com/Arts/Humanities/ History/20th_Century/World_War_II/Atomic_Bomb_The/ ) Hanson Baldwin, a military analyst for The New York Times wrote shortly after the war that Japan was in despairing form and ready to give up by July 26, 1945, at the clip the unconditioned resignation was demanded at Potsdam. The United States had even already broken Japan # 8217 ; s codification of messaging and knew that their embassador had been sent to M oscow to work out peace dialogues. Besides they had begun speaking of resignation a twelvemonth prior and in June of 1945 the emperor of Japan had begun discoursing options to contending to the terminal. Martin Sherwin says that American Intelligence relayed messages to the President about these events but they had no consequence on his concluding determination to drop the bomb. Howard Zinn feels that the bombardment of Nagasaki was certainly unneeded and that it seems the lone ground for its usage was that it was a Pu bomb whereas the one dropped on Hiroshima was filled with U. He posed the inquiry, # 8216 ; were the victims of Nagasaki portion of a scientific experiment? # 8217 ; ( www.he.net/ douglong/bard.htm ) The Nipponese people felt afterwards that while the first bomb may hold been necessary, the second was merely a war offense. Others hold the belief that Japan had already fundamentally mailed in their resignation before the bombardments and that dropping the bomb was li ke utilizing a maul to kill an emmet. In fact Truman himself had diary entries which stated his feeling that Russia come ining the war would supply such a jar to Japan that they would give up. Russia had said it would come in by August 15. The United States # 8217 ; determination on utilizing the atomic bomb weighed on many different positions and beginnings of information. The opposing statements stemmed from the belief that Japan would hold surrendered shortly plenty without an invasion. It was believed that a naval encirclement would choke off Japan or dropping the bomb elsewhere merely for them to see would frighten them to give up. Even if an all out invasion had to happen many believed that it would non be about every bit many lives and the protagonists of utilizing the bomb had stated. Despite these statements the determination was made to utilize it under the belief that a speedy terminal was needed. The authorities was making what it felt would delight its ain citizens the most. We did non necessitate the war to drag on any longer and were looking for the quickest manner out and it seemed this was true no affair what the effects would be. Truman # 8217 ; s ideas are best summed up by his diary as to why he d ecided to utilize the bomb whether Russia was traveling to come in the war with Japan or non. His statement from his journal from January 1, 1946, is from an unsent missive to Byrnes that discusses his feelings following Potsdam Conference about Russia come ining the war. It reads, # 8220 ; At the clip we were dying for Russian entry into the Nipponese War. Of class we found subsequently that we didn # 8217 ; t need Russians there and the Russians have been a caput aching to us of all time since. # 8221 ; He wrote on August 11, 1945, # 8220 ; We are all on border waiting for the Japs to reply. Have had a snake pit of a day. # 8221 ;